Class-conditional generative models are an increasingly popular approach to achieve robust classification. They are a natural choice to solve discriminative tasks in a robust manner as they jointly optimize for predictive performance and accurate modeling of the input distribution. In this work, we investigate robust classification with likelihood-based conditional generative models from a theoretical and practical perspective. Our theoretical result reveals that it is impossible to guarantee detectability of adversarial examples even for near-optimal generative classifiers. Experimentally, we show that naively trained conditional generative models have poor discriminative performance, making them unsuitable for classification. This is related to overlooked issues with training conditional generative models and we show methods to improve performance. Finally, we analyze the robustness of our proposed conditional generative models on MNIST and CIFAR10. While we are able to train robust models for MNIST, robustness completely breaks down on CIFAR10. This lack of robustness is related to various undesirable model properties maximum likelihood fails to penalize. Our results indicate that likelihood may fundamentally be at odds with robust classification on challenging problems.
Introduction
Figure 1: Linear interpolations of inputs and respective outputs of a conditional generative model between two MNIST and CIFAR10 images from different classes. X-axis is interpolation steps and Y-axis negative log-likelihood in bits/dim (higher is more likely under model). MNIST interpolated images are far less likely than real images, whereas for CIFAR10 the opposite is observed, making it trivial to fool the CIFAR density model with out-of-distribution samples.
Adversarial attacks are a prime example of un-intuitive deep network failures and mitigating them is an active research area [Szegedy et al., 2013 , Goodfellow et al., 2014c , Akhtar and Mian, 2018 . Conditional generative models have been proposed recently in various works as a way to overcome this problem [Schott et al., 2019 , Ghosh et al., 2019 , Song et al., 2018 , Li et al., 2018 , Frosst et al., 2018 . These models are an appealing approach for robustness against adversarial attacks for various reasons. First, by modelling the input density they should be able to detect out of distribution adversarial inputs. Second, unlike discriminative models that can ignore class-irrelevant information, conditional generative models cannot discard any information in the input, which potentially makes attacking them harder.
Given these properties, we first answer the question: Can we theoretically guarantee that a good conditional generative model is robust to adversarial attacks? In section 3 we show that even near-perfect conditional generative models can be fooled.
In section 4 we discuss the basis to empirically verify these robustness claims in practice. We identify several fundamental issues regarding the maximum likelihood objective for training conditional generative models and in section 5 we discuss various approaches to improve the training of these models.
In section 6 we evaluate the ability of the conditional generative models we train to detect adversarial attacks, even when the attacker tries to fool the detector as well. We find that even when models have good likelihoods and reasonable accuracy, problems arise in the way the model captures class information. Most strikingly these problems are not reflected by the commonly-used likelihood metric, leading to non-robust classification. These results may have wide-reaching implications, as it has been shown that robustness and generalization are closely related [Miyato et al., 2018] .
Our contributions:
• Our theoretical analysis reveals that near-perfect conditional generative models can still be confidently fooled. This result makes it impossible to guarantee robust detection of adversarial examples with conditional generative models.
• We identify various overlooked issues with training conditional generative models in practice and explore various solutions.
• Attacking the resulting models shows that while our proposed models defeat strong attacks on MNIST, they completely fail to robustly detect adversarial examples on CIFAR10.
• Analyzing the models reveals how maximum likelihood training leads to various undesirable properties, which can hamper the model's ability to detect adversarial examples.
Robust Classification with Generative Models
We present a brief overview of flow-based deep generative models, conditional generative models, and their applications to adversarial example detection.
Flow based generative models
Flow based generative models [Rezende and Mohamed, 2015 , Dinh et al., 2015 , Kingma and Dhariwal, 2018 compute exact densities for complex distributions using the change of variable formula. They achieve strong empirical results [Kingma and Dhariwal, 2018] and the closed form likelihood makes them easier to analyze than the closely related VAE [Kingma et al., 2014] . The main idea behind flow-based generative models is to model the data distribution using a series of bijective mappings
where z N has a known simple distribution, e.g. Gaussian, and all f i are parametric functions for which the determinant of the Jacobian can be computed efficiently. Using the change of variable formula we have log(
where J i is the Jacobian of f i and
The standard way to parameterize such functions f i is by splitting the input z i−1 into two
which is invertible as long as s(z 1 i−1 ) j = s j = 0 and we have log(| det(J i (z i−1 ))|) = j log(|s j |). For images the splitting is normally done in the channel dimension. These models are then trained by maximizing the empirical log likelihood (MLE).
A straightforward way to turn this generative model into a conditional generative model is to make p(z N ) a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) with one Gaussian per class, i.e. p(z N |y) = N (µ y , Σ y ). Assuming p(y) is known, then maximizing log(p(x, y)) is equivalent to maximizing log(p(x|y)) =
At inference time, one can classify by simply using Bayes rule. Note that directly optimizing log(p(x|y)) results in poor classification accuracy as discussed in section 4. This issue was also addressed in the recent hybrid model work [Nalisnick et al., 2019] .
Related Work
Deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks [Akhtar and Mian, 2018] , and while many attempts have been made to train robust models or detect malicious attacks, significant progress towards truly robust models has been made only on MNIST [Schott et al., 2019 , Madry et al., 2017 . Even CIFAR10 remains far from being solved from a standpoint of adversarial robustness.
One common belief is that adversarial attacks succeed by moving the data points off the data manifold, and therefore can possibly be detected by a generative model which should assign them low likelihood values. Although this view has been challenged in Gilmer et al. [Gilmer et al., 2018] , we later discuss how their setting needs to be extended to fully study robustness guarantees of conditional generative models.
Recent work [Song et al., 2018 , Frosst et al., 2018 , Li et al., 2018 showed that a generative model can detect and defend adversarial attacks. However, there is a caveat when evaluating detectability of adversarial attacks: the attacker needs to be able to attack the detection algorithm as well. Not doing so has been shown to lead to drastically false robustness claims [Carlini and Wagner, 2017a] . In [Li et al., 2018 ] the authors report difficulties training a high accuracy conditional generative model on CIFAR10, and resort to evaluation on a 2-class classification problem derived from CIFAR10. While they do show robustness similar to our Carlini-Wagner results, they do not apply the boundary attack which we found to break our models on CIFAR10. This highlights the need to utilize a diverse set of attacks. In [Schott et al., 2019] a generative model was used not just for adversarial detection but also robust classification on MNIST, leading to state-of-the-art robust classification accuracy. The method was only shown to work on MNIST, and is very slow at inference time. However, overall it provides an existence proof that conditional generative models can be very robust in practice. In [Ghosh et al., 2019 ] the authors also use generative models for detection and classification but only show results with the relatively weak FGSM attack, and on simple datasets. As we see in Fig. 1 and discuss in section 6, generative models trained on MNIST can display very different behavior than similar models trained on more challenging data like CIFAR10. This shows how success on MNIST may often not translate to success on other datasets.
Robust Detection Cannot be Guaranteed
In this section we discuss the possibility of guaranteeing robustness via conditional generative models. In the previous adversarial spheres work [Gilmer et al., 2018] the authors showed that a model can be fooled without changing the ground-truth probability of the attacked datapoint. This was claimed to show that adversarial examples can lie on the data manifold and therefore cannot be detected.
While [Gilmer et al., 2018] is an important work for understanding adversarial attacks, it has several limitations with regard to conditional generative models. First, just because the attack does not change the ground-truth likelihood, does not mean the model can not detect the attack. Since the adversary needs to move the input to a location where the model is incorrect, the question arises: what kind of mistake will the model make? If the model wrongfully gives low likelihood to the correct class without wrongfully increasing the likelihood of the other classes then the adversarial attack will be detected, as the joint likelihood over all classes moves below the threshold of typical inputs. Second, on the adversarial spheres dataset [Gilmer et al., 2018 ] the classes support does not overlap. If we were to train a conditional generative model p θ (x, y) (which does not have 100% test accuracy) then the KL divergence KL (p(x, y)||p θ (x, y)), where p(x, y) is the data density, is infinite due to division by zero (note that KL (p θ (x, y)||p(x, y)) is what is minimized with maximum likelihood). This poses the question, whether small KL (p(x, y)||p θ (x, y)) or small Shannon-Jensen divergence is sufficient to guarantee robustness. In the following, we show that this condition is insufficient.
The intuition why conditional generative models should be robust is as follows: If we have a good discriminative model then the set of confident mistakes, i.e. where the adversarial attacks must reside, has low likelihood but might be large in volume. For a conditional generative model, the set
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Figure 2: Counter example construction. Shown on the left are the two class data densities, on the right the Bayes-optimal classifier for this problem (assuming λ 1 > λ 2 ) and the model we consider. Despite being almost optimal, the model can be fooled with undetectable adversarial examples (red arrows). Detailed description in section 3. of undetectable adversarial attacks, i.e. high-density high-confidence mistakes, has to be small in volume. Since the adversary has to be ∆ close to this small volume set, the idea is that if we add some smoothness conditions that exclude pathological cases, e.g. a zero measure dense set like the rationals, the ∆ area around this small volume set should still be small. This is where the idea breaks down due to the curse of dimensionality. Expanding a set by a small radius can lead to a much larger one even with smoothness assumptions. Based on this insight we build an analytic counter-example for which we can prove that even if
where p = p(x, y) is the data distribution, and q = q(x, y) is the model. We can show that with probability ≈ 0.5 one can take a correctly classified input sampled from p, and perturb it by at most ∆ to an adversarial example that is classified incorrectly and is not detectable.
We note that the probability in every ball with radius ∆ can be made as small as desired, excluding degenerate cases. We also assume that the Bayes optimal classifier is confident and is not affected by the attack, i.e. we do not change the underlying class but wrongfully flip the decision of the classifier.
The counter-example goes as follows: Let U (a, b) be the density for a uniform distribution on an
Both classes are a mixture of two distributions, uniform on the unit sphere and uniform on an annulus, as shown in Fig. 2 . The model distribution is the following:
i.e. for y = 1 the model is perfect, while for y = 0 we replace the mixture with uniform distribution over the whole domain. If λ 1 λ 2 then points in the sphere with radius 1 should be classified as class y = 0 with high likelihood. If λ 2 >> 1 (1+∆) d then the model classifies points in the unit sphere incorrectly with high likelihood. Finally if 1 >> λ 1 then almost half the data points will fall in the annulus between 1 and 1 + ∆ and can be adversarially attacked with distance lesser or equal to ∆ by moving them into the unit sphere as seen in Fig. 2 . We also note that these attacks cannot be detected as the model likelihood only increases. In high dimensions, almost all the volume of a sphere is in the outer shell, and this can be used to show that in high enough dimensions we can get the condition in Eq. 2 for any value of and ∆ (and also the confidence of the mistakes δ). The detailed proof is in the supplementary material.
This counter-example shows that even under very strong conditions, a good conditional generative model can be attacked, so no theoretical guarantees can be given in the general case for these models. Our construction, however, does not depend on the learning model but on the data geometry. This raises interesting questions concerning the source of the susceptibility to attacks: Is it the model or an inherent issue with the data?
4 Issues with Maximum Likelihood
The Difficulty in Training Conditional Generative Models
Most recent publications on likelihood-based generative models primarily focus on quantitative results of unconditonal density estimation [van den Oord et al., 2016 , Kingma and Dhariwal, 2018 , Salimans et al., 2017 , Kingma et al., 2016 , Papamakarios et al., 2017 . For conditional density estimation, either only qualitative samples are shown [Kingma and Dhariwal, 2018] , or it is reported that conditional density estimation does not lead to better likelihoods than unconditional density estimation. In fact, it has been reported that conditional density estimation can lead to worse data likelihoods [Papamakarios et al., 2017 , Salimans et al., 2017 , which is surprising at first, as extra bits of important information are provided to the model. One way to understand this seemingly contradictory relationship is when considering our objective. When we train a generative model with maximum likelihood (either exactly or through a lower bound) we are maximizing the empirical approximation of E x,y∼P [log(P θ (x, y))] which is equivalent to minimizing KL(P (x, y)||P θ (x, y)). Consider now an image x with a discrete label y, which we are trying to model using P θ (x, y). The NLL objective is:
If we model P θ (y|x) as uniform we get that the second term is log(C) where C is the number of classes. This value is negligible compared to the first term E x∼P [− log(P θ (x))], i.e. the "penalty" for completely ignoring class information is negligible, so it is not surprising that these models can produce non-discriminative results. What makes matters even worse is that the penalty for confident mis-classification can be unbounded. It can also explain why the conditional ELBO is comparable to the unconditional ELBO [Papamakarios et al., 2017] . Another way to see this is by thinking of the likelihood as the best lossless compression. When trying to encode an image, the benefit of the label is at most log(C) bits which is small compared to the whole image. While these few bits are important for users, from a likelihood perspective the difference between the correct p(y|x) and a uniform distribution is negligible. This means that when naively training a class-conditional generative model by minimizing E (x,y)∼P [− log(P θ (x|y))], typically discriminative performance as a classifier is very poor.
Outlier Detection
Another issue arises when models trained with maximum likelihood are used for detection of outliers.
The problem is that maximum likelihood, which is equivalent to minimizing KL(P (x, y)||P θ (x, y)), is known to have a "mode-covering" behavior. It has been shown recently in [Nalisnick et al., 2019] that generative models, trained using maximum likelihood, can be quite bad at detecting out-ofdistribution example. In fact it has been shown that these models can give higher likelihood values, on average, to datasets different from the test dataset corresponding to the training data. In section 6.3 we show even more puzzling results, where we find that the interpolation of two images can be confidently detected as an outlier on one dataset, but is impossible to detect on another dataset. In section 6.4 we further show that even if the model classifies correctly, i.e. ∀j = y i : p θ (x|y = y i ) > p θ (x|y = j), then p θ (x|y = j) for a wrong class is still high enough to not be considered an outlier. We conclude that likelihood as an evaluation metric and training objective has serious flaws when it comes to outlier and adversarial detection, and even a model with good likelihood and accuracy can still exhibit many undesirable properties. The problem is that current models outputting exact or approximate density are mainly trained with maximum likelihood while models that train with other objectives, such as GANs [Goodfellow et al., 2014a , Arjovsky et al., 2017 , do not output calibrated scores and cannot help with outlier or adversarial detection.
Training Conditional Generative Models
We will now describe some of the various approaches we investigated in order to train the best possible flow-based conditional generative models, to achieve a better trade-off betwen classification accuracy and data-likelihood as compared to commonly-used approaches. We also discuss some failed approaches in the appendix.
Reweighting
The most basic approach, which has been used before in various works, is to reweight the discriminative part in eq. (5). While this can produce good accuracy, it can have an unfavorable trade-off with the NLL where good accuracy comes with severely sub-optimal NLL. This tradeoff has also been shown in [Nalisnick et al., 2019] where they train a somewhat similar model but classify with a generalized linear model instead of a Gaussian mixture model.
Architecture change
Padding channels has been shown to increase accuracy in invertible networks [Jacobsen et al., 2018 . This helps ameliorate a basic limitation in bijective mappings (see Eq. (1)), by allowing to increase the number of channels as a pre-processing step. Unlike the discriminative i-RevNet, we cannot just pad zeros as that would not be a continuous density. Instead we pad channels with uniform(0,1) random noise. In effect we do not model MNIST and CIFAR10 as is typically done in the literature, but rather the zero-padded version of those. While the ground-truth likelihoods for the padded and un-padded datapoints are the same due to independence of the uniform noise and unit density of the noise, this is not guaranteed to be captured by the model, making likelihoods very similar but not exactly comparable with the literature. This is not an issue for us, as we only compare models on the padded datasets.
Split prior
One reason MLE is bad at capturing the label is because a small number of dimensions have a small effect on the NLL. Fortunately, we can use this property to our advantage. As the contribution of the conditional class information is negligible for the data log likelihood, we choose to model it in its distinct subspace, as proposed by . Thus, we partition the hidden dimensions z = (z s , z n ) and only try to enforce the low-dimensional z s to be the logits. This has two advantages: 1) we do not enforce class-conditional dimensions to be factorial; and 2) we can explicitly up-weight the loss on this subspace and treat it as standard logits of a discriminative model. A similar approach is also used by semi-supervised VAEs [Kingma et al., 2014] . This lets us jointly optimize the data log-likelihood alongside a classification objective without requiring most of the dimensions to be discriminative. Using the factorization p(z s , z n |y) = p(z s |y) · p(z n |z s , y) we model p(z s |y) as Gaussian with class conditional mean e i = (0, ..., 0, 1, ...0) and covariance matrix scaled by a constant. The distribution p(z n |z s , y) is modeled as a Gaussian where the mean and variances are a function of y and z n .
Experiments

Training Conditional Generative Models
In this section, we investigate the ability to train a conditional generative model with good likelihood and accuracy simultaneously using a version of the state-of-the-art flow model GLOW [Kingma and Dhariwal, 2018] on MNIST and CIFAR10. All our models use zero padding as discussed in section 5.3, which we found to improve classification performance. The increase was partially due to the change in architecture possible only due to padding which makes direct comparison problematic. Model details are in the supplementary material. We compare three settings: 1) A class-conditional mixture of 10 Gaussians (Base). 2) A class-conditional mixture of 10 Gaussians with an upweighted p(y|x) term (Reweighted). 3) Our proposed conditional split prior (Split). Results can be found in As we can see, especially on CIFAR10, pushing up the accuracy to values that are still far from stateof-the-art already results in non-negligible deterioration to the likelihood values. This exemplifies how good accuracy without harming likelihood estimation is still a challenging problem. We note that while the difference between the split prior and re-weighted version is not huge, the split prior does offer better NLL and better accuracy in both experiments.
Adversarial attacks
We first evaluate the ability of conditional generative models to detect standard attacks, and then try to detect attacks designed to fool the detector. We evalulate both the gradient based Carlini-Wagner L 2 attack (CW-L 2 ) [Carlini and Wagner, 2017b] and the gradient free boundary attack [Brendel et al., 2018] . Results are shown in table 2 on the left. It is interesting to observe the disparity between the CW-L 2 attack, which is easily detectable, and the boundary attack which is much harder to detect.
Attacking
Classification Classification and Detection Next we modify our attacks to try to fool the detector as well. With the CW-L 2 attack we follow the modification suggested in [Carlini and Wagner, 2017a] and add an extra loss term det (x ) = max{0, − log(p(x )) − T } where T is the detection threshold. For the boundary attack we turn the C-way classification into a C + 1-way classification by adding another class which is "non-image" and classify any image above the detection threshold as such. We then use a targeted attack to try to fool the network to classify the image into a specific original class. This simple modification to the boundary attack will typically fail because it cannot initialize. The standard attack starts from a random image and all random images are easily detected as "non-image" and therefore do not have the right target class. To address this we start from a randomly chosen image from the target class, ensuring the original image is detected as a real image from the desired class.
From table 2 (right side) we can see that even after the modification CW-L 2 still struggles to fool the detector. The boundary attack, however, succeeds completely on CIFAR10 and fails completely on MNIST, even when it managed to sometimes fool the detector without directly trying. We hypothesize that this is because the area between two images of separate classes, where the boundary attack needs to pass through, is correctly detected as out of distribution only for MNIST and not CIFAR10. We explore this further below.
Image Interpolation
To understand why the learned networks are easily attacked on CIFAR but not on MNIST with the modified boundary attack, we explore the probability density of interpolations between two real images, as the boundary attack roughly proceeds along the line between the attacked image and the initial image. The minimum we would expect from a decent generative model is to detect the intermediate middle images as "non-image" with low likelihood. If this was the case and each class was a disconnected high likelihood region, the boundary attack would have a hard time when starting from a different class image.
Given images x 0 and x 1 from separate classes y 0 and y 1 and for α ∈ [0, 1] we generate an intermediate image
, and run the model on various α values to see the model prediction along the line. For endpoints we sample real images that are classified correctly and are above the detection threshold used previously. See Fig. 1 for interpolation examples from MNIST and CIFAR. (c) Class probability of interpolations on MNIST (d) Class probability of interpolations on CIFAR10 Figure 3 : Average Log likelihoods and class probabilities for interpolations between data points from different classes, x-axis is interpolation coefficient α. The MNIST model behaves as desired and robustly detects interpolated images. The CIFAR10 model, however, fails strikingly and interpolatd images are consistently more likely than true data under the model.
In figure 3 (a) we see the average results for MNIST for 1487 randomly selected pairs. As expected, the likelihood goes down as α moves away from the real images x 0 and x 1 . We also see the probability of both classes drop rapidly as the network predictions become less confident on the intermediate images. On CIFAR images, using 1179 pairs, we get a very different picture (see fig. 3 (b) ). Not only does the intermediate likelihood not drop down, it is even higher on average than on the real images albeit to a small degree. In classification we also see a very smooth transition between classes, unlike the sharp drop in the MNIST experiment. Lastly, 100% of the interpolated images lay above the detection threshold and none are detected as a "non-image" (for reference the detection threshold has 78.6% recall on real CIFAR10 test images). This shows that even with good likelihood and reasonable accuracy, the model still "mashes" the classes together, as one can move from one Gaussian to another without passing through low likelihood regions in-between. It also clarifies why the boundary attack is so successful on CIFAR but fails completely on MNIST. We note that the basic attack on MNIST is allowed to pass through these low density areas which is why it sometimes succeeds. Figure 4: NLL for images conditioned on the correct class vs the highest probability wrong class.
Wrong Class Outliers
Next we show that even conditional generative models that classify very well do not see images with the wrong label as outliers. To understand this phenomenon we first note that if we want the correct class to have a probability of at least 1 − δ then it is enough for the corresponding logit to be larger then all the others by log(C) + log
where C is the number of classes. For C = 10 and δ = 1e − 5 this is about 6, which is negligible relative to the likelihood of the image, which is in the scale of thousands. This means that even for a good conditional generative model which confidently predicts the correct label, the pair {x i , y w = y i } (where w is the leading incorrect class) cannot be detected as an outlier according to the joint distribution, as the gap log(p(x i |y i )) − log(p(x i |y w )) is much smaller than the standard deviation of NLL values. In Fig. 4 we show this by plotting the histograms of the likelihood conditioned both on the correct class and on the most likely wrong class over the test set. In other words, in order for log(p(x i |y w )) to be considered an outlier the prediction needs to be extremely confident, much more than we expect it to be, considering test classification error.
Conclusion
In this work we explored limitations, both in theory and practice, of using conditional generative models to detect adversarial attacks. Most practical issues arise due to likelihood, the standard objective and evaluation metric for generative models by which probabilities can be computed. We conclude that likelihood-based density modeling and robust classification may fundamentally be at odds with one another as important aspects of the problem are not captured by this training and evaluation metric. This has wide-reaching implications for applications like out-of-distribution detection, adversarial robustness and generalization as well as semi-supervised learning with these models.
A Implementation details
We pad MNIST with zeros so both datasets are 32x32 and subtract 0.5 from both datasets to have a [-0.5,0.5] range. For data augmentation we do pytorch's random crop with a padding of 4 and 'edge' padding mode, and random horizontal flip for CIFAR10 only.
The model is based on GLOW with 4 levels, affine coupling layers, 1x1 convolution permutations and actnorm in a multi-scale architecture. We choose 128 channels and 12 blocks per level for MNIST and 256 channels and 16 blocks for CIFAR10. In both MNIST and CIFAR10 experiments we double the number of channels with uniforrm(0,1) noise which we scale down to the range [0, 2/256] (taking it into account in the Jacobian term). One major difference is that we do the squeeze operation at the end of each level instead of the beginning, which is what allows us to use 4 levels. This is possible because with the added channels the number of channels is even and the standard splitting is possible before the squeeze operation.
The models are optimized using Adam, for 150 epochs. The initial learning rate is 1e − 3, decayed by a factor of 10 every 60 epochs. For the reweighted optimization the objective is
where D is the data dimension (3x32x32 for CIFAR, 1x32x32 for MNIST).
For adversarial detection we use a threshold of 1.4 for MNIST (100% of test data are below the threshold) and 4. for CIFAR10 (78.6% of test images are below the threshold).
B Negative results
In this work explored many ideas in order to achieve better tradeoff between accuracy with little or no impact.
B.1 Robust priors
Since the Gaussian prior is very sensitive to outliers, one idea was that confident miss-classifications carry a strong penalty which might result in "messing" all the classes together. A solution would be to replace the Gaussian with a more robust prior, e.g. Laplace or Cauchy. Another idea we explored is a mixture of Gaussian and Laplace or Cauchy using the same location parameter. In our experiments we did not see any significant difference from the Gaussian prior.
B.2 Label Smoothing
Another approach to try to address the same issue is a version of label smoothing. In this new model the Gaussian clusters are a latent variable that is equal to the real label with probability 1 − and uniform on the other labels with probability . Using this will bound the error for confident miss-classification as long as the data is close to one of the Gaussian centers.
B.3 Flow-GAN
As we claimed the main issue is with the MLE objective, it seems like a better objective is to optimize KL (p(x, y)||p θ (x, y)) or the Jensen-Shannon divergence as this KL term is highly penalized for miss-classification. It is also more natural when considering robustness against adversarial attacks. Optimizing this directly is hard, but generative adversarial networks (GANs) [Goodfellow et al., 2014b] in theory should also optimize this objective. Simply training a GAN would not work as we are interested in the likelihood value for adversarial detection and GANs only let you sample and does not give you any information regarding an input image.
Since flow algorithms are bijective, we could combine the two objective as was done in the flow-GAN paper [Grover et al., 2018] . We trained this approach with various conditional-GAN alternatives and found it very hard to train. GANs are know to be unstable to train, and combining them with the unstable flow generator is problematic.
C Analytical counter example:
Assume p(y = 1) = p(y = 0) = q(y = 1) = q(y = 0) = 1/2 and p(x|0) = λ 1 U (0, 1) + (1 − λ 1 )U (1, 1 + ∆) (7) p(x|1) = λ 2 U (0, 1) + (1 − λ 2 )U (2, 3) (8) q(x|0) = U (0, 1 + ∆) (9) q(x|1) = λ 2 U (0, 1) + (1 − λ 2 )U (2, 3)
where U (a, b) is the uniform distribution on the annulus R d (a, b) = {x ∈ R d : a ≤ ||x|| ≤ b} in dimension d. Lemma 1. For ||x|| < 1 we have
Proof. The U (a, b) density (when it isn't zero) is 
Lemma 3. If 1 > λ 1 > 1 (1+∆) d and λ 1 < d log(1+∆) then KL(P (x, y)||q(x, y)) ≤ Proof. Again using the KL chain rule we have KL(P (x|y = 0)||q(x|y = 0)) = λ 1 such that KL(q(x, y)||p(x, y)) < , KL(p(x, y)||q(x, y)) <
but with probability greater then 1/3 over samples x ∼ p there is an adversarial examplex satisfying:
